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F
ollowing the pioneering work of La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (La
Porta et al. 1998; “LLSV”), it has become fashion-
able among economists to classify countries ac-
cording to their legal origin and study different
aspects of their company laws and economic devel-
opment to compare them. One important element
of the LLSV research lies in the idea that the “legal
origin” of a country – namely, the world-wide dis-
tinction between different legal families, such as
common law and French, German, and Nordic civil
law – in some way influences national financial
development.
In an earlier paper Siems (2007) already discussed
the unhelpfulness of legal origins in comparing laws
across countries and suggested instead more
precise criteria for this purpose. Our paper uses a
“leximetric analysis”1 of shareholder protection in
three common law countries (the UK, the US and
India) to show that even amongst three undoubted-
ly “English legal origin countries”the laws can vary
so much as to make their classification into one sin-
gle group according to their legal origins seem
almost naïve.
This article is structured as follows: first we set out
the main contentions of the LLSV studies. Second,
we discuss our new shareholder protection index and
the choice of the UK, the US and India for this arti-
cle. By using our leximetric analysis we then com-
pare the laws of the UK, the US and India.
Main contentions of the LLSV studies 
Put simply, the core arguments of the LLSV studies
are that (i) the extent of protection afforded to
shareholders and creditors by a legal system deter-
mines the extent to which firms will be able to obtain
external financing; and (ii) the common law coun-
tries (“English legal origin countries”) offer greater
protection than the civil law countries (“French,
German, and Nordic legal origin countries”). Legal
origins thus determine the financing of corporate
growth, and through that and other channels, the
nature of the financial system and ultimately, per-
haps, overall economic growth.
While LLSV’s initial research was a bit crude or ad
hoc, over time it became slightly more refined (La
Porta et al. 2006; Djankov et al. 2003, 2005, 2006;
Botero et al. 2004)2 and included efforts to try and
explain the causal mechanisms by which legal ori-
gin may influence financial development. One of
the leading hypotheses explaining the causal rela-
tionship is the “adaptability mechanism”. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, judges in common law
legal systems are able to change the law on a case-
by-case basis, thereby keeping pace with changes in
the society and ensuring the adaptability of regu-
lation to changed circumstances. In contrast, ci-
vilian legal systems suffer from rigidity, as changes
through legislation may be made infrequent-
ly.3 LLSV also claim that there is a difference in
“regulatory style”: common law systems typically
favour market solutions, i.e. contracts and private
litigation as opposed to detailed “top down” regu-
lation and enforcement through government agen-
cies in civilian systems (Beck et al. 2003; Botero et
al. 2004).
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We use a new shareholder protection index of
60 variables for a period of 35 years to compare the
laws of the UK, the US and India. This article thus
ties in with a previous article of ours on the coding of
shareholder protection in five countries.4 However,
now we look more closely at the striking features of
the three common law countries and highlight the
differences in the ways in which each of these coun-
tries approach the topic of shareholder protection.
For the present article we have decided to look at
the UK, the US and India only. Whilst the UK is of
course the “mother country”, the choice of the US is
also easily defendable as the world’s largest econo-
my.We chose India because it is a “transplant coun-
try” – UK laws were transmitted to India during its
colonisation by the British.India is also a developing
country, with one of the fastest growing economies,
and the biggest democracy in the world.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the aggre-
gate of all the 60 variables from our shareholder pro-
tection index for a period of 35 years. One can see
that there are differences in these countries across
the time series and that the differences in the aggre-
gates between UK and Indian law have decreased in
recent times whereas those between Indian and US
law have increased over the period. What is more,
both the Indian and the US graphs show a similar
pattern of change – namely, fewer changes (see the
smaller steps and bigger plateaus) for most parts of
the time-series and then a quantum leap in the last
four years as opposed to the incremental and near
constant changes in the UK graph. The sweeping
increase in scores around 2001 for India and 2002 for
the US are a result of the strengthening of corporate
governance norms in these countries with the intro-
duction of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement and
the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, respectively. In con-
trast the UK graph shows smaller,steadier and incre-
mental changes – one can quite easily recognise, for
instance, the steps resulting from the company law
reform of 1980 and 1985 and then the changes in the
1990s caused mainly by the codes of best practices.5
It is interesting that although the UK and the Indian
graphs are quite similar for 2005, it was the Indian
and the US graphs that had the same score in the
early 1970s.6To elaborate on the differences between
the Indian and the UK graph:Indian commercial laws
are for the most part based on the UK laws, e.g. the
Indian Companies Act of 1956, which is the basic
company law legislation even today, is based on the
UK Companies Act of 1948.Yet,when India adopted
a socialist policy after independence, it began to
develop certain features of its own.For example,pro-
visions concerning public enforcement of company
law contained in the Companies Act of 1956.7
Changes to UK law in 1980, mainly as a result of the
EU Capital Directive 77/91/EEC, improved the
aggregate score of the UK so that it matched the
aggregate score for India.They shared the same score
only until 1985, when reforms in UK company law
and corporate governance codes continued the UK
on its steady path of improved protection, leaving
India behind. However, in recent times, the UK and
Indian graphs have come closer – mainly due to the
introduction of corporate governance norms in India
based largely on the UK codes.8
With respect to the differences between the Indian
and the US graph, the strengthening of provisions in














Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2007).
GENERAL LEVEL OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
measured by aggregating 60 variables
Figure 1
4 See Lele and Siems (2007);for details of
our data, see http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/
research/programme2/project2-20out-
put.htm.
5 Companies Act 1980; Companies Act
1985; Cadbury Committee, Code of Best
Practice 1992; Greenbury Committee,
Code of Best Practice 1995; Hampel
Committee, Combined Code of Best
Practice 1998.
6 Of course,a similar score does not mean
that the two countries have identical laws.
Indeed, as we looked at different aspects
of company law that can protect share-
holders, it is possible that the same score
is a result of both countries protecting
shareholders in entirely different areas;
see also Lele and Siems (2007; 37).
7 See “Public control and mandatory
law”, below (p. 6), for details.
8 Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement,
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circular dated 21-2-2000 and implement-
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relation to public enforcement of company law in
India in 1975 moved the two countries apart.A fur-
ther increase in India’s score in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, mainly due to changes in its takeover
law, increased this gap.9 Although both countries
made a quantum leap in the last four years as a result
of the strengthening of corporate governance norms,
the basic gap between the two continues to exist.
The difference in the UK and US graphs has been
considerable almost throughout the entire 35 years,
with the exception of a brief period between 1985
and 1986 when they both shared the same score. To
elaborate, US law had a slightly better score until
1984 but then the steady improvement in the UK
shareholder protection law slowly reduced the gap
between the two.These improvements strengthened
the directors’ duty of care and included a remedy
against minority oppression and the duty to disclose
major shareholder ownership.It is also interesting to
note that, after a brief period in the mid-1980s when
they both shared the same score, the UK curve
continued to climb higher with improved scores
mainly resulting from successive company law
reforms and codes of best practices.10 The US score
on the other hand only improved in the last few
years, mainly because of the Sarbanes Oxley Act
2002,but it is still a much lower score than that of the
other two countries.11
Modes by which shareholder protection is changed
It is obvious from Figure 1 above that the scores of
all three countries have increased over time, so that
one can say that shareholder protection has
increased in these countries over the past 35 years.
What is not so obvious,however,are the mechanisms
adopted by each of these countries to protect share-
holders and also the mode by which changes have
occurred across this time.
With respect to the latter, we observe that the most
common mode of legal reform in all three common
law countries has been legislative changes. Of the
101 (UK: 33; US: 40; India: 28) times that changes in
these three countries occurred in the relevant peri-
od, 86 of them were a result of legislation or subor-
dinate legislation. Thus, contrary to the predictions
of the adaptive mechanism, according to which
judges in common law countries are deemed to be
better equipped to define law on a case-by-case basis
and hence adopt the law to suit the changes in the
society – at least in the field of shareholder protec-
tion – the most common form of bringing changes in
the law has been through legislation.
Particularly,whilst the Indian curve in this picture of
aggregates exhibits a change at least 28 times, not a
single change is attributable entirely to the authori-
tative restatement of the law by the judiciary.This is
based on various historical and systemic reasons:
most areas of substantive as well as procedural laws
applicable in India were inherited in the form of cod-
ified laws drafted by the British as early as the 1870s.
Socialistic policy post-independence meant that
preference was given to top-down regulation and
central planning and that there was a bias towards
legislative mechanisms for legal reform. Further,
inordinate judicial delays seriously impede the work-
ing of jurisprudence as a mechanism of legal reform
in India. For instance, on an average it takes any-
where up to 20 years for a case to be resolved.12 To
be sure, the point here is not that judicial precedents
are not important in India – indeed true to its com-
mon law legal origin (at least to this extent), judicial
precedents are given their due, considered almost
sacrosanct and created consciously bearing in mind
their consequences for future parties.13 But the point
is that judicial delays curtail the role of the judiciary
in reforming the law to better adapt to the changing
needs of the society. Over time, therefore, India
seems to have moved away from the common law
tradition of changing the law on a case-by-case basis
and toward the tradition of detailed rule-making
backed by public enforcement mechanisms, which is
usually associated with the civil law countries.14
The UK, the US and India differ not only in the
modes by which shareholder protection has changed
over time but also in the mechanisms by which they
protect shareholders and in the areas of emphasis.To
further highlight the differences in areas of emphasis,
in Figure 2, we aggregate the variables dealing with
9 Introduction of Clause 40 B of the Listing Agreement in 1980;
SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
Regulations 1994; SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and
Takeovers) Regulations 1997.
10 See note 5 above.
11 It should be noted that our 60 variables are included and coded
because they are relevant for shareholder protection, but they do
not represent “maximum” or “optimum” protection for sharehold-
ers. A larger score on our index need not necessarily mean better
protection for shareholders. Please see Lele and Siems (2007;
33–35) for more on this.
12 See Debroy (2000).
13 Interviews with judges in India by John Armour and Priya Lele
in September 2006.
14 For similar or more on this, see also a forthcoming paper by
Armour and Lele (2007).public control and mandatory provisions.In Figure 3,
we aggregate variables that deal with voting power of
shareholders, and in Figure 4 we aggregate variables
that are particularly significant for listed companies.
There are various ways in which shareholders may be
protected in a legal system.For instance,with respect
to the protection of minority against majority share-
holders, quorum and supermajority requirements
may ensure that a significant majority approves deci-
sions, fiduciary principles may control the voting of
the majority shareholder,or appraisal rights may pro-
vide the minority shareholder a way to exit the com-
pany for full compensation (see Lele and Siems
2007). But it is possible that these private means do
not work or are not deemed very effective so that the
state acts to protect the interests of the involved par-
ties.We looked at some of the ways in which the state
may interfere to protect the interests of the share-
holders,and these variables are clubbed together and
represented graphically in Figure 2 as “public control
and mandatory provisions”. These include variables
relating to public enforcement, for instance, direc-
tors’ disqualification, public authorisation for direc-
tor’s self-dealing of substantial transactions, public
authorisation for appointment of managers,power to
intervene in cases of prejudice to public interest or
interest of the company,as well as variables that mea-
sure the extent to which company law is mandatory.
In the case of India, following a socialistic precepts,
the state took on an even greater role in company
law to protect interests of the involved parties –
hence the higher scores. For instance, whilst a direc-
tor’s self dealing does not require general meeting
approval in Indian law, it requires central govern-
ment authorisation. Similarly,
minority shareholders in India
may approach the central gov-
ernment to intervene in cases of
oppression or mismanagement
by a majority (although actual
intervention by government is
extremely rare). However, it is
interesting to note that even in
India, there is an increasing
trend to (i) reduce instances
requiring the state’s authorisa-
tion, and (ii) even where such
authorization is required, to del-
egate the powers of the central
government to the local compa-
ny registrars for speedier action
and convenience to all. Thus, for instance, the
requirement of prior authorisation of the govern-
ment for appointment of managerial personnel has
been relaxed since 1988, with the introduction of
Schedule XIII (as amended from time to time),
admittedly to make the law more flexible and to give
companies more freedom in this respect.15
Unsurprisingly, the two developed countries contain
fewer provisions for public control and mandatory
law and hence score lower on this graph. However,
there are some provisions that are mandatory or
involve public enforcement or control in the US and
the UK, and we observe some development in their
curves during the relevant period. In the US this is
not based on company but on securities law. For
instance, mandatory securities law addresses direc-
tors’ disqualification,proxy voting and the one-share
one-vote principle. The only question of company
law which is coded here is the 1986 amendment to
Delaware’s corporate law, which now provides that
directors’ liability for breach of duty of care is no
longer mandatory but can be excluded in the certifi-
cate of incorporation – therefore the drop in the US
curve in 1986. Finally, UK company law has the least
amount of mandatory features or provisions con-
cerning public control. Concerning the rules on dis-
qualification of directors, which were strengthened
in the UK, first in 1976 and then in 1989, we observe
some improvement in the UK scores leading to small
“steps” in the UK curve during that period.














Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2007).
PUBLIC CONTROL AND MANDATORY PROVISIONS
measured by aggregating 11 variables
Figure 2
15 Finally, although we do not code proposed changes, it is interest-
ing to note that the 2005 JJ Irani Report on Company Law Reform
(available at http://www.primedirectors.com/pdf/JJ%20Irani%
20Report-MCA.pdf) proposes to remove public control of self-
dealing by directors and instead to require a general meeting re-
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A “democratic”perception of the company may sug-
gest that shareholder voting in the general meeting is
most important. Thus, Figure 3 we have aggregated
all variables which directly concern the voting power
of shareholders.This concerns, on the one hand, ten
variables which code different powers of the general
meeting. On the other, we considered the impor-
tance of the vote of minority shareholders by coding
quorum and supermajority requirements, the one-
share one-vote principle,cumulative voting,and pro-
hibition of voting by interested parties. However,
other topics which are related to the general meet-
ing, such as involvement and information in its run
up or the right to ask questions,have not been taken
into a account in this aggregate.
The most interesting feature about Figure 3 is that
the laws of the three countries evolved in different
directions. Whilst the UK curve shows an improve-
ment,the US curve actually fell a few points,and the
Indian curve remained more or
less stable. The improvement in
scores for the UK is attributable
to the strengthening of powers
of the general meeting in 1980
and then in 1985.16 In contrast to
this, whilst the US law on the
powers of the general meeting
has hardly changed, with respect
to the one-share one-vote prin-
ciple, the 1994 amendments to
the NYSE Listed Company
Manual made it easier to issue
shares with multiple-voting
rights and voting caps – thereby
reducing the US score. Finally,
the Indian curve has remained
stable for most parts of the time series apart from a
minor decrease in the score in 2000 due to changes in
the law allowing issuance of new shares with differ-
ential voting rights and then the partial recovery in
2001 resulting from the introduction of a provision
which facilitates election of a small shareholders’
director.17
For the general aggregate (see above) we coded the
law as applicable to listed companies, yet most vari-
ables of our index would also apply to unlisted com-
panies. Some of the variables are usually only signif-
icant for listed companies, however. In Figure 4, we
aggregate such variables.These include, for instance,
variables relating to the composition of the board of
directors, disclosure requirements in relation to
directors’ remuneration and of major share owner-
ship, requirements of strict neutrality in case of
takeovers and of mandatory and public bids, as well
as compliance with corporate
governance codes.
In Figure 4 the difference bet-
ween the two developed coun-
tries and India is most obvious.
Yet, there are differences
between the UK and the US
curves as well. The initial slight
advantage of the UK law over










Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2007).
VOTING POWER OF SHAREHOLDERS 















Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2007).
LISTED COMPANY VARIABLES 
measured by aggregating 9 variables
Figure 4
16 Regarding allotment of shares and
long-term service contracts in 1980 and
de-facto changes in 1985.
17 This marginally improved the score in
relation to the variable on “proportional
representation” included in this group of
aggregates.differences in their regulation of takeovers – of the
two only UK law contains requirements of mandato-
ry bid and strict neutrality in case of takeovers.18 In
the 1990s the various best practice codes further
improved the UK’s score steadily.The US curve only
made some progress with the Sarbanes Oxley Act in
2002. Still, the consistently lower score of the US may
be surprising. It is important to point out, however,
that because of our focus on rules that address the
protection of shareholders (and not investors and
capital markets in general),numerous aspects of secu-
rities law have not been taken into account. For
instance, the rules on insider trading and transparen-
cy of financial information are not coded in our index.
The Indian curve has the lowest scores for almost the
first two decades because the law in India in this area
only began to develop in the late 1980s and since the
beginning of this century has experienced a consid-
erable leap.19Although India is one of the few devel-
oping countries that had a comparatively well devel-
oped equity market at independence – fragmented
but active stock markets –,socialism,which followed
in India in the 1950s through to the 1970s, led to a
stagnation of the markets. In the 1950s the first blow
to the free market came with the closing of the capi-
tal account and under the new socialistic legislation,
like the Securities Contract Regulation Act 1954,the
equity markets suffered from excessive control. For
instance, not only was the issuance of fresh equity
regulated – in the sense that it required permission
from the government – but pricing was controlled as
well. Reforms that began in the late 1980s and most-
ly after the liberalisation of the Indian economy, i.e.
post-1991, have made a huge difference in the law
relating to listed companies. The establishment of
the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) was
a landmark in this regard: it is an independent regu-
lator with powers to enact subordinate legislation for
coordinating market activities and governing listed
companies,and is backed by powers of enforcement.
Securities legislation, mostly in the form of subordi-
nate legislation from SEBI, including the changes in
the Listing Agreement, the enactment of SEBI
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
Regulations in 1994 and 1997, and the introduction
of corporate governance norms by adding Clause 49
to the Listing Agreement led to a rise in the scores of
the index.
Conclusion 
Previous research often emphasised the similarity of
shareholder protection in common law (or “English
legal origin”) countries. This article, however, has
found a remarkable diversity of shareholder protec-
tion in common law countries. Using our new share-
holder protection index with 60 variables, we have
presented some graphical representations to high-
light and discuss diversity across the UK,the US and
India. Our study shows that the UK, the US and
India not only differ in the modes by which laws on
shareholder protection have changed over time but
also in the mechanisms by which they protect share-
holders and in the areas of emphasis. For instance,
we found that of the three countries, the Indian law
on shareholder protection has changed the least due
to laws made by judges and contains the maximum
number of provisions relating to “public control or
mandatory law” as a mechanism for protecting
shareholders. The UK law on “voting powers” has
improved over the concerned period with increased
empowerment of the general meeting. With respect
to the laws dealing with “listed company variables”,
we found that in the UK the law has improved
steadily since the 1990s and in the US there was a
dramatic leap in 2002. The laws in India in this
regard began developing only after the late 1980s
and early 1990s with major improvements around
2001.Thus our study shows that even amongst three
undoubtedly “English legal origin countries” the
laws vary so much that their classification into one
single group according to their legal origins seems
almost naïve. This also casts a doubt on the claim
that a particular legal origin has an impact on the
quality of law,which in turn affects corporate growth
and economic development.
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